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By: Inder Malhotra
November 17, 2011: Burma's leadership seems to be treading a newly liberal path, writes Andrew Small, though obstacles to real democratic change remain.
Is Burma about to experience a democratic spring? For the first time in decades there is real optimism about the political future of the nation.
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A number of factors give hope that the heavily military-dependent government that was elected in March last year is now embarked on a path of liberalisation, however limited, which will lead to greater democratisation and pave the way for the country to escape from international isolation. There have been myriad small indicators of the change underway — and all can easily be reversed — but the most substantial seems to be the rapprochement between the regime and the democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. One of the first signs was the re-appearance in the presidential palace of images of her assassinated father, General Aung, the independence hero. The junta has tried hard to write him out of Burmese history in the last few decades and his 'resurrection' seems to signal what Suu Kyi's visit to the palace on August 19 for her meeting with Thein Sein,
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Burma's semi-civilian ruler, indicated: a more involved role for 'the Lady' in Burmese politics. As one government official put it: 'It was important to show the Lady that we are willing to work with her. We see her as a potential partner, not an adversary.' A remarkable reversal of intent after the years she has spent under house arrest. The meeting, which seems to have been relaxed and friendly and an attempt to establish a working basis for the future, surprised most observers, as have the other rapid moves which transformed the political scene in a few short weeks. All the indicators are that the talks focussed on Suu Kyi's role as an individual personality in her nation's life and although the party she leads, the National League for Democracy (NLD), remains illegal it will not be harassed, according to accounts emerging in the media. Daw Suu Kyi, winner of the Nobel Peace prize in 1991, has been allowed to give an interview to the local media, something unthinkable for the last few decades, and has been allowed to travel outside Rangoon. These are significant changes in the stance of the junta, immediately raising the question of whether Thein Sein can carry through with them although it is a fair working assumption that he has got the support of his fellow government ministers. Perhaps as significant were the other unheralded moves the government was making in opening up the country to outside influences. These include the unblocking of several important international news sources, including the BBC, the Democratic Voice of Burma and the Burmese language broadcasts of Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America. Prior to these changes the government had also removed blocks on Skype, Yahoo and Youtube. The most immediate public manifestation of the new mood was the long-promised release of political prisoners, with the first batch being freed in the middle of October. Among them was a long-time antagonist of the regime, the comedian Zarganar, who was included in the initial 70. He was jailed for criticising the government's poor response to Cyclone Nargis. The ethnic Shan leader Hso Ten, who had been serving a 106-year term, was also freed. In total it is expected that more than 6,000 will eventually win their freedom. But critics of the government's gesture, including the opposition NLD, noted that the regime had treated common criminals and political prisoners alike and that key figures from the 88 Generation Students group, Min Ko Naing and Ko Ko Gyi, both serving 65-year terms in remote Shan state, were not freed, most likely because the government is only too aware of their powerful appeal in the pro-democracy movement. The pair were among the leaders of the iconic 1988 revolt, which was massively repressed by the military government. It is believed that there are 2,000 political prisoners in Burma. Among them are many monks who were jailed after the famous monks' revolt of 2007. Concurrent with these political developments has been the surprise blockage of a key dam project with China in the war-torn Kachin state. The $3.6 billion Myitsone dam will be suspended 'according to the desire of the people', maintains the Burmese government. It came as news to most people that the regime really cared what the people thought but, on the face of it, it could be another sign of liberalisation as urged by the Europeans, Americans and others. It is true that opposition to the dam has been growing and it has been a rare point of agreement among the opposition and some members of the old military elite, who may have finally woken up to the degree that the Chinese are hijacking their economy. On completion in 2019, the dam would have produced 29,400 million kilowatt hours of electricity, 90 per cent of which would have gone to China. There are six other dam projects up stream of the suspended dam, all involving Chinese and Burmese firms, though so far there has been no word on the fate of the others. But it is unlikely they will be immediately affected since the Chinese government has said it will expect Burmese compensation for its losses on the suspended project. On the other hand, there could be a perfectly logical explanation for the suspension that has nothing to do with government worries about public opinion: the fact that, according to rebel sources in the area, fighting between the army and Shan rebels has meant that no building materials have been able to reach the site of the dam from the Chinese side. On the other hand, Wikileaks revelations show that the US Embassy in Rangoon has made a point of aiding small grassroots organizations, such as those opposing the dam, with its largesse. Could this all be a pointer to the future of other megabucks projects such as the port facility due to be built on the south-west coast at Dawei/Tavoy by the Italian-Thai Development Company? The Burmese government clearly hopes that the release of political prisoners will be sufficient to get the Americans and Europeans to review their sanctions policies. The freeing of political prisoners is a key element of that but it is not clear that the Burmese have yet done enough. A formidable barrier to real democratic change remains the 2008 constitution, which gives the armed forces the last say on everything. Suu Kyi and the NLD have refused to recognize it and there will be no reconciliation with minority groups so long as it is in place. It should go, to be replaced by a more equitable document if the government is serious about moving forward. Nor is the lifting of sanctions the only goal of the government. A more important international prize comes up in 2014, when Burma is due to assume leadership of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Burmese leadership knows that it has to do something to make its political system more attractive if it is to reach the same exceedingly modest standards as its fellow members. But the leadership of ASEAN would be a signal like no other that would indicate that Burma is finally coming out of its shell. |